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Abstract 
Using the characteristics and the demands of the recent uprisings in the Middle East 
and North Africa or so called “Arab Spring,” this study questions the significance of 
some propositions deduced from Huntington’ popular theory of “The Clash of               
Civilizations.” The research asserts that globalization, especially the development of 
new technology, has created opportunities for the new generations in the region to be 
acculturated with a set of values reflecting their basic civilian and human rights. The 
new values, while credited with the development in the West, belong to all human 
beings and are gaining the status of universal human culture. The development of this 
universal culture undermines Huntington’s clash of civilizations. The paper ends with 
an explanation of why Huntington puts his emphasis on “clashes,” rather than a 
“universal culture” or “alliance” of cultures.  
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 Samuel Huntington was one of the most popular but                       
controversial American social scientists, especially among scholars 
involved with the issue of culture and/or global socio-political                
changes. Since the publication of his book, The Clash of Civilizations, 
literally hundreds, probably thousands of books or papers have been 
published, and conferences or speeches have been assembled to cover 
the validity and significance of the “Clash of Civilizations.” The                  
theory, originally published as an article in Foreign Affairs in 1993, was 
mostly dismissed by the intellectual community, but after the                         
September 11 terrorist attack in the United States, “Huntington’s                
triumph” started and “The Clash of Civilizations” became the New 
York Times bestseller book (Abrahamian 2003). In interviews with 
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Media, for example Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (August 18, 
2006), Huntington said the 9/11 event confirmed the clash of cultures 
and civilizations.1 His critiques, however, disagree with his underlying 
theoretical assumptions. For example, Edward Said (2001) has                 
confronted the notion of fixed civilizations and puts more emphasis 
on the dynamics and interdependence of most civilizations.2 Fred     
Halliday, a British Middle Eastern specialist, portrays the theory as 
extremism supported by anti-modernists and fundamentalists because 
“East and West” for them are separate and they “are all distinct and 
there will inevitably be conflict” (2002:194). He explains political    
tensions between the Muslims and the West by international politics 
of the West, especially in the Middle East between USA-Israel                  
dissention with Muslims over Palestine as the main cause of the 9/11 
terrorism (2001).3 One can have the same impression from 
Brzezinski’s strategic vision on “America’s stake in a constructive  
resolution of Israel-Palestinian conflict. This conflict poisons the              
atmosphere of the Middle East, contributes to Muslim extremism, and 
is directly damaging to American national interests” (2012:124).                
Michael Dunn characterized the clash of civilizations as the ideology 
of conservatives on both sides, i.e., Al-Qaeda or fundamentalist             
Muslims and neo-conservatives in the West. “Clearly, the creation of a 
discourse that portrays ‘Islam’ on the one hand and ‘the West’ on the 
other is… beneficial to the leaders of Islamic militant groups” (2006-
7:5). Finally, “Clashes of Civilizations” entails to assume a civilization 
as the unit of analysis while underestimating the clashes within a             
civilization; there are fundamental disagreements among the Muslim 
communities themselves, for example between Shias and Sunnis, on 
the meaning of “Islamic Culture,” which is at the center of                         
Huntington’s theory.  
 The recent regional Muslim uprisings in the Middle East and 
North Africa, or so called “Arab Spring,” have developed new realities 
upon which sociologists can assess variety of the theories and/or 
propositions conceptualized in several sociological fields, such as               
social change and revolution, political sociology, cultural universalism, 
social identity, and so on. Unlike the September 11/2001 event, the 
regional Muslim uprisings challenge the validity of Huntington’s               
theory and demand more robust propositions to explain socio-
political clashes on national and international levels. This paper, using 
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qualitative data (such as the characteristics of the uprisings and their 
public demands, citations from reporters and Middle Eastern experts, 
etc.) argues against the “clashes” of civilizations as the major source of 
conflicts in the post Cold-War era. Rather, it underlines the power of 
an emerging universal human culture (set of values) composed of 
basic human and civil rights without ignoring the importance of native 
cultures. This newly development human culture as expressed today, 
regardless of its historical roots, emerged from the Post-World War II 
human and civil right discourses (Donnelly 1989).The response of the 
Muslim world to this newly developed culture, unlike Huntington’s 
view in the “Clash of Civilizations,” has been very mixed from                  
assimilation to confrontation.4 Most extreme Muslims such as Al-
Qaeda and Taliban, rejecting the Western culture including human 
rights, offer the Sharia law as the only alternative. Others, especially 
educated people such as Wafa Sultan, the Arab-American author of A 
God Who Hates (2011) or Abdel-Samad, an Egypt-German author and 
journalist (2010), considers human rights as the values of all human 
beings. The research rests on the awakening idea in the Muslim world, 
especially among the new generation, directed against their states failed to 
resolve their socio-economic problems while suppressing their human 
rights. First, the author argues the newly developed human culture was 
underestimated in Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations.”                             
Furthermore, putting more emphasis on human dignity as the cause 
or incentive behind the regional socio-political uprisings, the research 
challenges Huntington’s “cultural identity” as the driving force behind 
the clashes of civilizations. Finally, the paper addresses why                     
Huntington comes to clash, rather than alliance of cultures, more 
specifically between Islam and the West. But first, a brief review of 
“The Clash of Civilizations” and a short background of the regional             
Muslim uprisings, upon which the shortcomings of Huntington’s              
theory would be assessed. 
 
THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS 
 In response to Francis Fukuyama’s book, The End of History 
and the Last Man, published in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and inspired by Bernard Lewis’ article, “The Roots of Muslim 
Rage,” published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1990, Samuel Huntington 
proposed the clashes of religions, especially between Muslims and the 
3
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West, under the “Clash of Civilizations” as the primary source of              
international conflicts in the Post-Cold War era. The central theme of 
the book, as Huntington says, “…is that culture and cultural identities, 
which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the 
patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the Post-Cold 
world” (1996:20). 
Before Huntington’s paradigm, Bernard Lewis (1990)                    
theorized the “Roots of Muslim Rage” against the Western                       
Civilization in his article and later developed it in his book, Islam and 
the West (1993). According to Lewis, Muslims in clash with Western 
Civilization have “suffered from three successive stages of defeats.” 
During the first stage, they lost their domination in the world to the 
advancing power of the West. Then, it was the era in which the                
Muslims’ authority was undermined in their own countries, “through 
an invasion of foreign ideas and ways of life.” Finally, “their mastery 
in their own houses was challenged by their emancipated women to 
rebellious children…It was too much to endure, and the outbreak of 
rage against these alien and infidel forces was inevitable” (1990:49).  
Huntington elaborated and expanded Bernard Lewis’ theory 
to large-scale conflicts in the Post-Cold War era among seven to eight 
major civilizations, especially between the West and “non-West.” He 
argues that the fundamental source of conflicts in the Post–Cold War 
era would not be primarily ideological but cultural between different 
civilizations. Since the people of different civilizations have different 
views on their social relationships, for example, between citizens and 
state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as different 
views of “rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and 
hierarchy” (1993:25). These differences are the products of centuries 
and will not soon disappear. In these conflicts, Huntington adds, the 
key question is not “Which side were you on” as it was during the Cold-
War within which people could choose and change the sides. In                
conflicts between civilizations, the question is “What are you?” The 
answer for this question cannot be easily changed. Now the                            
international issues are “between Western and Islamic civilizations has 
been going on for 1,300 years and it would unlikely to 
cease” (1993:31). 
While Huntington identifies seven to eight civilizations, the 
core of the clashes in the book is limited to between the West and 
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“the rest,” specifically between the United States and the Islamic               
culture. He says “the underlying problem for the West is not the                      
Islamic fundamentalism. Rather, it is Islam, a different civilization whose 
people is convinced of the superiority of their cultural identity and is 
obsessed with the inferiority of their power” (1996:217, emphasis         
added). He specifies five factors intensified the conflicts between              
Islam and the West in the Twentieth Century: 
 
 First, Muslim population growth which 
has generated large numbers of unemployed and 
disaffected young people who become recruits to 
Islamist causes, exert pressure on neighboring  
societies, and migrate to the West. Second, the 
Islamic Resurgence has given Muslims a renewed 
confidence in the distinctive character and worth 
of their civilization and values compared to those 
of the West. Third, the West’s simultaneous                
efforts to universalize its values and institutions, to 
maintain its military and economic superiority, and 
to intervene in conflicts in the Muslim world               
generate intense resentment among Muslims. 
Fourth, the collapse of communism removed the 
common enemy of the West and Islam and left 
each the perceived major threat to the other. Fifth, 
the increasing contacts between Muslims and 
Westerners stimulate in each a new sense of their 
own identity and how it differs from that of the 
other. Interaction and intermingling also                      
exacerbate differences over the rights of members 
of civilization in a country dominated by members 
of the other civilization. Within both Muslim and 
Christian societies, tolerance for the other                 
declined sharply in the 1980s and 1990s. 
(1996:211).  
 
THE “ARAB SPRING” 
 The movements apparently started in Tunisia on December 
17, 2010, when a young man, Mohammad Bouazizi, set himself on 
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fire in front of a local municipal office because the police confiscated 
his card and beat him the day before, and his complaint was ignored. 
Before the Tunisian uprising, however, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
experienced its own public uprising, called the “green movement” 
after the disputed presidential election in June 12, 2009. Iranians are 
not Arab but a majority are Muslim. However, like the other Middle-
Eastern and North-African nations, the Iranians have suffered from 
authoritarian and tyrannical regimes for many decades. The uprising 
was peaceful and the public demand was simple; “where is my vote?” 
They were asking for nullification of the official results which were 
rigged, based on many reliable reports. For example, Hooman Majd, 
author and an observer of the events, reported that “the Green   
Movement.., led by the reformists but also a spontaneous creation of 
its own—a sort of immaculate conception of the political kind—was 
Iran’s first real civil rights movement, one not so unlike the civil rights 
movement in the United States a short half-century ago” (2010:43). 
He adds: 
 
 Iranians came out onto the street—
young, old, bearded, clean-shaven, chador-clad, 
pious, secular, and Chanel-wearing fashionistas for 
all to see, to register their disapproval of what they 
believed to be a rigged vote, an insult to every  
Iranian who believed that the one truly democratic 
aspect of their system had been rudely violated 
(54).5  
 
Some Middle Eastern experts agree that the Iranian green 
movement has inspired the Arab uprisings, and their success, in turn, 
further encourages and sustains the Iranian democracy-seekers.6 While 
the Iranian regime suppressed the uprising by arresting, torturing, and 
killing hundreds of activists and called them “proxy of foreign foes,” 
the oppositions are still alive, and according to Christian Science Monitor 
(June 2011) “the movement has achieved its goal by gaining high  
moral ground, revealing the true face of the Islamic Regime, and 
draining away much of its political legitimacy.”7 However, unlike the 
suppressed Iranian green movement, the uprising in Tunisia was               
successful and inspired new waves of unrest in some other Muslim 
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nations, such as Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Yemen, Morocco, Bahrain, and 
Syria.  
In Tunisia, small demonstrations started in Bouazizi’s 
hometown and spread throughout the country. While desperate self-
sacrifice highlighted public frustration over living standards and                
economic inequality, the core of protests however were against police 
brutality, official unaccountability, lack of transparency, and                        
suppressed civilian and human rights. For example, Dalacoura                 
reported one of the popular protest chants: “We can live on bread and 
water alone but not with RCD [Ben Ali’s ruling party]” (2012:67).8  
The outcome of Tunisia’s uprising has been cautiously promising 
since the moderate Islamic party, Ennahda with a shrewd leader, Al-
Ghannouchi, made a coalition government with secular parties and 
openly rejected the Iranian type of Islamic Republic. According to 
Esam Al-Amin (2011), a writer and journalist, “Tunisian people have 
sent an unambiguous message that they want moderate Islamists and 
secularists to work together in establishing democratic governance and 
building a just socio-economic system, while preserving hard-won 
freedoms and liberties, as well as respecting human rights and the    
Arab-Islamic identity of Tunisia.”9 
In Egypt, following the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia, the 
uprising started in Cairo and spread throughout the country. The 
demonstrations were peaceful and the demands mostly addressed on 
the economic hardship and inequality while the chants were focused 
on democracy, freedom, and human rights. Like Tunisia, the Mubarak 
regime attempted to crash the uprising but failed since the opposition 
was mostly united, regardless of their religions. For instance,                      
according to Aljazeera reports, Christians were protecting Muslims at 
the Friday prayers and the Muslims did the same for the Christians on 
the following Sunday.10 The prospect for democracy and human rights 
in Egypt is mixed. Some believe the Middle East in general is 
“immune” to “democratization.” Others are cautiously optimistic. 
Ajami, a Middle-Eastern specialist and a Lebanese’s-American fellow 
in the Hoover Institute, says a “plausible division of spoils and                
responsibility might give the [Islamic] Brotherhood the domains of 
governance dearest to it—education, social welfare, and the                          
judiciary—with the military getting defense…Liberal secularists would 
have large numbers, a say in the rhythm of daily life in a country so 
7
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hard to regiment and organize, and the chance to field a compelling 
potential leader in a future presidential election”(2012:4).11 The unity 
and technocratic government of Prime Minister Hisham Qandidl and 
the recent public criticism and demonstrations against the                                
undemocratic Islamist elements of the newly written constitution 
mainly support such an optimism.  
In Libya, Qaddafi ruled the country since 1969 as a military 
dictator. He repressed the basic rights of his citizens and ruthlessly 
crushed dissidents. According to Billingsley, “Libya has no history of 
rule of law and no experience with a competitive political process. 
Sharia was the formal basis of law and was frequently applied to               
matters of family law...the regime tended to wield power arbitrarily, 
with little attempt to cloak its actions in legal cover” (2011:4). He also 
adds that “Libya’s draft constitutional charter…is encouraging. The 
document prohibits discrimination on the ground of race, religion, 
and political opinions. The charter also guarantees women ‘all                      
opportunities’ to participate in the political, economic, and social 
spheres” (2011:4).12 
By the end of 2011, three governments had been                      
overthrown—Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt, and Gaddafi in 
Libya; more recently, in early 2012, Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen. The 
Syrian regime has killed more than 60,000 of its citizens based on the 
recent United Nations report.13 The UN Secretary General, Ban            
Ki-moon who has spoken several times with Bashar Al-Assad, the 
Syrian president, condemned the continuing violence of the regime 
against the peaceful demonstrations, most particularly the use of tank 
and live fire that killed and injured thousands of people. Meanwhile, 
some other Arab leaders, understanding the nature of public demands 
and the escalation of the uprisings, such as King Abdullah in Jordan 
and King Mohammad VI in Morocco, have made significant political 
and social reforms in their constitutions and thereby in their                       
governments. For example, King Abdullah dismissed unpopular 
Samir Rifai’s government and asked Marouf-al-Bakhit to form a new 
government with the purpose of reforms and newly proposed                  
constitutional amendments. In Morocco, the king had appointed a 
committee to revise the constitution which was approved in a                     
referendum on June 30, 2011.  
8
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Overall, many observers and reporters agree that the            
protesters have represented a broad coalition of poor and middle     
classes, Muslims and Christians, men and women, especially young 
generations who have access to internet and new mass media. While it 
is hard to generalize, anti-West, anti-American, and even anti-Israeli 
slogans were absent in the uprisings. Indeed, as Dalacoura (2012)             
reported, the most demands were firmly on national issues, political 
and economic, not primarily on Arabism and Islam. Paul Salam 
(2011), the director of Carnegie Middle Eastern Center in Beirut, in an 
interview with “Hurriyet Daily News” stressed: 
 
 Now we are entering a new era. We had 
the era where political Islam in a non-democratic, 
often violent, format was the proposed solution. 
This is the era where democratization is the key. 
Political Islam is coming under the context and 
conditions of a democracy. And obviously the 
Turkish example of a party with Islamic roots                   
successful in a democratic state is the most                    
attractive model for the states that have been 
through a revolution (2011:2).14  
 
The common denominators of the uprisings can be classified 
under the features or characteristics of the uprisings and the major 
public demands. With regard to the characteristics, the uprisings were 
launched and organized mostly by youths; the Internet (Facebook, 
Twitter, Mobile-phone, YouTube, etc.) played significant roles in             
organizing the unrests and the satellite, especially the Qatari-based Al-
Jazeera, on broadcasting the events; finally, the uprisings have been 
initially peaceful and civilized, while extremism, violence, and terrorism 
were condemned. On the public demands, the emphases have been 
on economic and employment opportunities; asking for governmental 
accountability and opposing to corruption; demanding the rules of law 
with respect to freedom, democracy, and human rights.  
 
 
 
9
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CLASHES OF CULTURES OR TENDENCY TOWARD A                            
UNIVERSAL CULTURE 
 Huntington minimizes the emergence of a universal culture, a 
set of values reflecting basic human and civil rights, since the “central 
elements of any culture or civilization are language and religion.” 
Therefore, a universal civilization requires a global culture with a               
universal religion and language. He adds, “If a universal civilization is 
emerging, there should be tendencies towards the emergence of a            
universal language and a universal religion” (1996:59). No evidence 
exists to support that English or any other languages have been               
gaining the universal status since “throughout history the distribution 
of languages in the world has reflected the distribution of power in the 
world” (1996:62). The same is correct about a “universal” religion. 
The “data do show increase in the proportions of the world                  
population adhering to the two major proselytizing religions, Islam 
and Christianity, over eighty years” (1996:65).15 Therefore, “universalism 
is the ideology of the West for confrontations with non-Western cultures 
[emphasis added].” The “most enthusiastic proponents of the single civilization 
idea are intellectual migrants to the West…for whom the concept provides a highly 
satisfying answer to the central question: Who am I?” (1996:66) [Emphasis 
added]. 
The regional uprisings and their public demands are not                 
consistent with Huntington’s “non-universal human culture”                   
proposition. For example, Tawakkol Abdel-Salam Karman, a Yemeni 
activist in the uprisings who later became one of the three Nobel 
Peace Prize winners in 2011, summed up the characteristics of the 
uprisings and the major public demands in her Nobel Prize acceptance 
speech. She started her speech with “[i]n the name of God the               
Compassionate the Merciful” and added: 
 
 At this moment, as I speak to you here, 
young Arab people, both women and men, march 
in peaceful demonstrations demanding freedom 
and dignity…The Arab people who are revolting 
in a peaceful and civilized manner have, for so 
many decades, been oppressed and suppressed by 
the regimes of authoritarian tyrants who have  
indulged themselves deeply in corruption and in 
10
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looting the wealth of their people…The people 
have decided to break free and walk in the                   
footsteps of civilized free people of the world…
Our youth revolution is peaceful and popular and 
is motivated by a just cause, and has just demands 
and legitimate objectives, which fully meet all  
divine laws, secular conventions and charters of 
international human rights…peace, human                
coexistence, fight against corruption and                   
organized crime, war on terrorism, and resistance 
to violence, extremism and dictatorship, …and are 
cherished by the whole international community. 
The revolutions of the Arab spring in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, and other Arab 
countries,…in terms of motivation, driving power 
and objectives, didn’t take place on isolated               
islands cut off from all the rapid and astonishing 
developments and changes which our world is 
witnessing. The Arab people have woken up just 
to see how poor a share of freedom, democracy 
and dignity they have… This experience is                  
somewhat similar to the spring that swept 
throughout Eastern Europe after the downfall of 
the Soviet Union.16 
 
Tawakkol’s speech, reflecting the uprising characteristics and 
demands, does not confirm Huntington’s proposition that universal 
culture is the “ideology of the West” to confront non-Western                 
cultures. Freedom, democracy, and human rights in general, while 
credited with development in the West, belong to all human beings. 
They have gained the status of “cultural universals” in sociology. The 
people in the region, like Tawakkol, are not intellectual migrants to the 
West who are looking for a satisfying answer for “Who am I.” Rather, 
they are ordinary citizens who ask for their civil and human rights in 
their own nations. Second, the people in the region, like all the citizens in 
the international community, have started their peaceful uprising 
against governmental corruption and asking for democratically-
elected, accountable governments that respect their human and                   
11
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civilian rights. All the uprisings originally rejected extremism and                          
demanded their rights in a civilized manner; as Tawakkol expressed 
in her speech, they rejected extremism and followed the civilian 
means to achieve their civil goals. Finally, while Tawakkol did not 
ignore her “Islamic identity” when she started her acceptance speech 
with an Islamic phrase and her hair covered, but she did not ask for 
an Islamic government or Sharia law, rather, she underlined their  
human and civil rights. The same have been reported among the  
other groups, including the Islamists, such as the Islamic                             
Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia.17 Dalacoura comes to 
the same conclusion that “[n]one of the uprisings was led by an                
Islamic movement or posited a demand for an Islamic state; if                  
anything, they were post-ideological, patriotic and ‘introverted’ in the 
sense of being focused on internal national politics” (2012:79). Thus, 
Samuel Huntington’s reductionism of civilization to religion leads 
him to overemphasize the conflicting elements of Western and              
Muslim cultures while ignoring/underestimating the power of the 
shared and evolving universal civil and human values which have 
been enhanced in universal culture.  
 
THE DRIVING FORCE: HUMAN DIGNITY OR CULTURAL 
IDENTITY 
 The driving force behind the clashes of civilizations is 
“cultural identity” as the answer to “who am I?” Huntington says 
“identity almost always is defined by religion.” Religion,                        
psychologically, provides the most reassuring and supportive identity 
during rapid social transformation. “Religion provides compelling 
answers, and religious groups provide small social communities to 
replace those lost through urbanization…Religions give people                 
identity by positing a basic distinction between believers and                    
nonbelievers, between superior in-group and a different and inferior 
out-group” (1996 97). Huntington adds that the new generation of 
Muslim is not going to be necessarily “fundamentalists but will be 
much more committed to Islam than their predecessors… As a               
result, the early years of the twenty first century are likely to see an 
ongoing resurgence of non-Western power and culture and the clash 
of the peoples of non-West civilization with the West” (1996:121), 
12
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especially between Islam and the West. Thus, following Huntington’s 
proposition, “Islamic identity” is and should be the driving force,  
especially among young Muslims, for socio-political changes at the 
national or international levels. 
The public demands in the uprisings have not been in                  
agreement with his “cultural identity” proposition either. Emphases in 
human rights and human dignity, rather than Islamic identity, were the 
major demands in all the uprisings. Three activists in the regional              
uprisings, who were later announced winners of Roland Berger                 
Human Dignity Award in Berlin and shared their EUR 1 million 
award in November 2011, did not mention their cultural identity as 
their driving force in the uprisings. Rather, they emphasized human 
dignity and human rights in the acceptance speeches—Ms. Radhia 
Nasraoui from Tunisia (the founder of the Association for the Fight 
Against Torture in Tunisia); Gamal Eid from Egypt (the founder of 
the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, ANHRI), and 
Mr. Mazen Darwish from Syria (the founder of the Syrian Center for 
Media and Freedom of Expression—SCM). Gamal Eid, for example, 
said “I am extremely proud to be honored together with two of the 
greatest human rights campaigners in the Arab world. I have devoted 
myself to this task because I firmly believe human rights activists need 
to focus on supporting the people who live under repression and              
desire nothing more than to live in democracy.” Mazen Darwish said 
“History teaches us the price of freedom may be high; but the price of 
tyranny is even higher… to date more than 4000 Syrian (women, men, 
and children) have paid for road to freedom with their lives after        
overcoming the barrier of fear…”18 Marquand, the Christian Science 
Monitor staff writer, conceived “human dignity” as the major search at 
the heart of the “Arab Spring.” He wrote, Qaddafi asked “Libyans to 
rely on his ‘moral authority’- a request that ever more sophisticated 
Arab generations widely read as an insult to their intelligence.” 
“Eating bread is no longer enough. They want bread, liberty, and             
dignity. Is that too much to ask?” (2011). Hillary Clinton, the Secretary 
of the United States said in Geneva, February 28, 2011: “We see in 
their struggles a universal yearning for dignity and respect. And they 
remind us that the power of human dignity is always underestimated 
until the day it finally prevails…This moment belongs to the people, 
particularly the young people, of the Middle East.”19   
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These and many other regional facts substantiate the                      
following points: First, the uprisings were against the regimes having 
the same cultural identity but suppressing their civil rights and human 
dignity. Unlike Huntington’s expectation, the public’s demands in the 
streets were not “cultural identity,” and the activists were asking for 
the support of human rights organizations and the West, rather than                
chanting against or seeking to clash with the West. Second, as earlier 
mentioned, the public demands for democracy and human dignity do 
not necessarily mean that the activists have ignored their cultural  
identity. Most of the activists and participants in the uprisings, without 
undermining their native cultural identity, have been fighting for their 
dignity and human rights, that is, for the elements of their universal culture. In 
fact, their clashes with their Muslim tyrants for their human dignity 
and freedom reveal the alliance rather than the clash with cultures. 
Brzezinski, unlike Huntington, believes that the moderate Islamic 
identity is compatible with democratization: 
 
 Turkey’s internal democratization and 
spread–modernization is evidence that neither 
democratization nor modernization is                           
incompatible with Islamic religious traditions. 
Such democratization is of great importance to 
the political future of the Islamic world as well as 
to global stability… A Turkey that is increasingly 
Western, secular, and yet also Islamic—and that 
exploits its territorial and cultural connection with 
the people of the old Ottoman Empire and post 
Soviet Central Asian states – could be a Turkey 
that underestimates the appeal of Islamic                      
extremism and enhances regional stability …
(2012:138).   
 
The alliance of culture/civilizations was proposed at the 59th 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 2005 co-sponsored by 
Turkish Prime-Minister Tayyip Erdogan and the President of Spain, 
Luis Rodrigues.20 Finally, Huntington’s view on “Islamic identity” as a 
stable entity which “has been a seesaw for 1,300 years” ignores the 
dynamism of human identity. Social psychology teaches us that                   
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identity is a dynamic human quality that evolves during any                     
socialization process. People may develop and change their identity 
based on their religion, nationality, language, or human values. The 
young Muslims, because of their growing access to ideals of human 
and civil rights in the West during the last several decades, are gaining 
awareness of their human and civil rights and evolving their identity. 
This identity transformation sometimes involves conflicting cultural 
elements. Gallop Polls of the Islamic world or Pew Surveys have              
revealed a variety of conflicting cultural elements among Middle               
Eastern Muslims. For example, Pew surveys show 82% of Egyptians 
supported stoning as a punishment for adultery, while 90% supported 
freedom of religion, and 70% were against censorship, or a Gallop 
Poll shows “some 93% of the those surveyed called themselves 
‘moderate’ Muslims” and the remaining 7% identified themselves as 
‘radicals’ but “admire the West for its democracy and freedom.                  
However, they do not want such things imposed on them.”21 
 
WHY HUNTINGTON STRESSES ON THE “CLASHES” OF 
CIVILIZATIONS     
 “The Clash of Civilizations” stands on, at least, three                     
questionable assumptions. First, Huntington overestimates Muslim                
fundamentalism:While he says the underlying problem for the West is 
Islam, not Islamic fundamentalism, his evidence mostly comes from 
extremists. For example, Huntington says, “…it is hardly surprising 
that following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, an intercivilizational quasi 
war developed between Islam and the West” (1996:216).22 He adds, 
“Khomeini declared, quite accurately, that ‘Iran is effectively at war 
with America, and Qadhafi regularly proclaims holy war against the 
West’” (1996:216). For Huntington, this renewed war between Islam 
and the West started with “perceived ‘gharbzadegi’ or Westoxication” 
among Muslims during the1980s and 1990s (1996:213). Huntington 
quotes from Barry Buzan and Bernard Lewis showing the West’s                
perception of the clash between the two cultures, concluding that the 
West “prepared not only to support a societal Cold War with Islam, 
but to adopt policies that encourages it” (1996:213). 
 The uprisings’ characteristics and their demands, including 
the Iranian green movement, have proven otherwise. There was no 
single expression or demand in the uprisings to show hostile attitudes 
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of the people toward the West, including the United States. During 
the 9/11/ 2001 incident, despite the hostile attitude of the Iranian 
regime, thousands of Iranian people displayed sympathy toward the 
United States people and against terrorism by holding a public           
candlelight vigil. Dunn asserts after all, “Osama bin Laden’s attempts 
to provoke a ‘clash of civilizations’ have ‘turned out to be a                       
spectacular failure.’ One can find evidence for this in the Iranians who 
gathered outside of the US embassy in Tehran on the night of 9/11, 
not to chant anti-US slogans but to offer their sympathies, or to the 
enduring anti-war movement in the West. These examples are                      
antitheses on the ‘clash of civilization’…” (2006-7:07). During the 
recent regional uprisings, the people not only called for their human 
and civil rights (so called Western Values) but asked for Western help 
to fight against their Muslim leaders who suppressed their rights.                
Despite Qadhafi’s rhetoric, Libyan people overthrew him by Western 
supports. Thousands of Muslims have died in Iran, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Yemen, Libya, and Syria, not in clashes between Islam and the West, 
but in clashes with their Muslim governments with the same cultural 
identity. Furthermore, Huntington uses “Westoxication” a few times 
to display the renewal of the Muslim hated toward the West. The term 
“gharbzadegi” (Westoxication) originally came from Iran during 1970s 
when a leftist writer (Jalal Al-e Ahmad) published a book with the 
same title which attracted the attention of some educated people               
during the Cold-War era. However, the book and the author’s ideas 
were later strongly challenged by almost all intellectuals and educated 
publics, especially after the 1979 Iranian revolution. Finally, unlike 
Huntington’s expectation, fundamentalist regimes, such as the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, are not the role models for the uprisings. Dalacoura 
concludes that “the uprisings are a confirmation that the appeal of the 
Iranian Islamist model is declining….In those cases where Islamists 
may benefit directly from the unfolding political changes, as in Tunisia 
and Egypt, they look for inspiration to the success of Turkey’s AKP 
rather than Iran” (2012:79). The same has been confirmed by other 
Middle Eastern experts that Muslim Brotherhood “are realizing that if 
they cannot get jobs and the economy going, people will not like them 
either…They look to Turkey for advice not to Islamic Theology of 
Iran. They know that they have more to learn from Turkey than from 
Saudi Arabia or Iran.” “Islamic slogans were hardly visible during   
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uprisings even though Islamists were there.” They agreed on the 
words “civil state”; as the new buzz words.23   
 Second, Huntington reduces the meaning of culture: If one limits 
the meaning of culture and civilization to “religion plus language,” 
Huntington is right none of the participants in the regional uprisings 
was demanding to change their religion or language. However,               
Huntington, by emphasizing religion and language as the core of               
culture, underestimated the meaning and evolving nature of culture. 
Culture has a much broader definition than “religion plus language.” 
Culture consists of all the shared products of human society. These 
products are of two basic kinds, material and non-material. Some of 
these “shared products” have been universal because of common 
natural environment. However, cultural universals do not merely               
derive from common natural environment; rather, social and cultural 
contacts with other civilizations have been the major source of                   
acculturation. The demands in the uprisings revealed the evolving 
nature of generational culture, including their human and civil values and 
rights. During the uprising, the participants revealed their answer to 
Huntington’s question, “who am I.” The answer was, like all other     
people, I am a citizen and a human being and asking for my rights, before 
putting any emphasis on my language or religion.   
 Finally, Huntington under-powers cultural dynamism: Rejecting 
universal culture, Huntington acknowledges the “universal nature of 
modernization.” Modernization comprises “industrialization,                    
urbanization, increasing levels of literacy, education…, social                    
mobilization, and more…” (1996:68). But surprisingly, he ignores or 
underestimates the roles of increasing literacy, education, social                
mobilization, and sciences on cultural changes and on the mentality of 
people, especially on youth. Universal new technology such as                 
internet, Twitter, Face-book, YouTube, and so on, as evidence of                 
modernization, has facilitated cultural exchanges and exposed “universal 
human culture” to new generations in the Muslim world.                         
Huntington’s theory, the clash of civilizations, underestimates the 
significant impacts of modernization on the mentality and culture of 
people, especially on younger generations. The interactive nature of 
new technologies and their accessibility to the public, especially to 
educated people, are exposing and educating them to their human and 
civil rights. Bernard Lewis is right when he says it is not easy to create 
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free institutions “in a political culture where religion and ethics have 
been more concerned with duties than with rights, in which                 
obedience to legitimate authority is a religious obligation as well as 
political necessity…” (1994:47). However, both Huntington and Lewis 
have underestimated the dynamic and speed of cultural                               
transformation in the new technology era within the Muslim nations. 
The time-unit of cultural change within new generations, including 
Muslims, no longer is a century or even a decade, but rather years. The 
characteristics of social relationships and mentality of one generation 
becomes culture of the new generation after a few or more years. 
Elaborating on William Wilson’s (2010) proposition on today’s                  
dynamic societies, social structure and mentality of one generation 
becomes culture of the newer generation.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 As Salam said, the Twenty-First Century in the Middle East is 
the era of democratization; “political Islam is evolving within the context of a 
democracy” (2011:02). Such a transformation, however, is not and will 
not be peaceful, especially between the West and fundamentalist   
Muslims such as Al-Qaida in the region, and/or the Taliban in                 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. This confirms and is consistent with                 
Huntington’s “the fault-line” conflicts. It is, however, part of the              
regional reality. The uprisings have revealed an evolving new reality 
reflecting political, civil, and human right-awakening in the region, 
which is establishing a new culture, or universal culture along with 
their native cultures. This evolving new culture was underestimated/ 
ignored in Huntington’s clashes of civilizations. The uprisings have 
proved a significant shift in the tendency and attitudes of young                
Muslims toward the West, viewing “Western culture” (the human and 
civilian culture credited with blooming in the West) as their “alliance” 
and supporter of their human and civil rights. The new Muslim               
generations who have worried Huntington because of their “cultural 
identity” turned out to be the agent of this cultural transformation in 
the region. Huntington says the Post-Cold War era would not be                
ideological, rather “clashes of civilizations,” but his cultural                       
reductionism in the final analysis turns the “clash of civilizations” to 
clashes between two ideological extremists, Muslim extremism and neo-
conservatism; the following diagram displays his reductionism. 24  
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Civilization → Culture → Religion plus Language → Religion →     
Fundamentalism       
 
 Civilization is originally reduced to culture; culture reduced to 
religion plus language; because there are no clashes over the languages, in 
reality, “the clashes of civilizations” is nothing more than “the clashes 
of religions,” more specifically between Islam and the West; finally his 
documentations are almost entirely focused on Islamist extremism.  
Of course, we should not glorify “Arab Spring” and celebrate 
assumed upcoming democratic and accountable states respecting their 
human and civil rights. The uprisings were started by young secular 
activists who rejected both US-backed dictators, such as Mubarak, and 
religious extremism like Iranian theocracy. The overthrow of tyrants, 
however, is much easier than building democratic institutions and 
mentality. Furthermore, there are socio-economic groups, both secular 
and religious, in all of those nations that are eager to restore their               
status or to gain power and resources. The uprisings may result in   
other tyrannical regimes or fundamentalist theocracies as it did in Iran. 
However, as the evidence and the public demands revealed, the               
uprisings displayed many positive signs of “awakening.” For the first 
time, the people in the street, regardless of their religion, were demanding 
their rights and fighting for their human dignity, not for religious or 
“Cultural Identity.” The uprising and their public demands have 
proved that freedom, democracy, and civil rights belong to all human 
beings. They have gained the status of “cultural universal” in                       
sociology.      
 Furthermore, if there is any clash or clashes between the             
Islamic and the Western cultures or civilizations, as proposed by     
Huntington for the early decades of the Twenty-First Century, the 
uprisings have revealed it is not necessarily between the West and Islam, 
rather between two generations within the Islamic civilization. The new 
generation in the Muslim nations are awakening, but not                        
“Islamic-Awakening” alleged by the Iranian “supreme leader” 
Khamanei; rather “political-awakening” (Brzezinski, 2012) or more 
meticulously, “human and civil rights-awakening.” This awareness 
undermines and challenges the status and power of tyrannical leaders, 
either religious, such as the Islamic Republic leaders, or secular                
tyrannies as in the cases of the Arab Spring. Hamed Abdel-Samad 
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made the following remark on the clashes of the Islamic and the      
Western civilizations.  
 As far as I can tell, the ‘clash of                     
civilizations’ seized upon by the late Samuel                
Huntington has long become reality. But it is              
important to realize that it take place not only   
between Islam and the West, as many suspected it, 
but also within the Islamic world itself. It is an 
inter-Islamic clash between individualism and   
conformity pressure, between continuity and             
innovation, modernity and the past.25  
 
In Abdel-Samad’s view, the Islamic world is in crisis. “I view 
today’s Islam as seriously ill, both culturally and socially, as in                 
retreat.” Fundamentalism and religiously motivated violence reflect 
“merely nervous reactions to this retreat” (See: Endnote 24). Almost 
the similar remark was made by Wafa Sultan on the nature of clashes 
between Muslim fundamentalism and the West.  
 
 The clash we are witnessing around the 
world is not a clash of religions or a clash of               
civilizations. It is a clash between two opposites, 
between eras. It is a clash between a mentality that 
belongs to the Middle Ages and another mentality 
that belongs to the 21th century. It is a clash               
between civilization and backwardness, between 
the civilized and the primitive, between barbarity 
and rationality. It is a clash between freedom and 
oppression, between democracy and dictatorship. 
It is a clash between human rights, on the one 
hand, and violation of the rights, on the other 
hand. It is a clash between those who treat women 
like beasts, and those who treat them like human 
beings.” (Al-Jazeera TV, Feb 21, 2006). 26 
 
While both Abdel-Samad’s view and Sultan’s remark are 
their own individual and intellectual assessments of the Islamic world 
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and not the public Muslim mentality and social reality, they reveal, 
however, that the cultural alliance or the growing universal human culture 
along with their native culture are awakening them to their human and 
civil rights. Such awareness makes them to question, reinterpret, and 
sometimes react to their religiously imposed “duties,” and this is a 
promising sign of cultural transformation.  
Finally, the economic hardship, especially higher                            
unemployment rates among the educated youth as well tremendous 
socio-economic inequality as the driving force and the major immediate 
cause of the uprisings should not be ignored. For example, according 
to the United Nations’ Human Development Research Paper (Salehi-
Isfahani 2010), youth are the most educated segment of the                 
population in the region, yet suffer greater exclusion for economic and 
civic life. The same report shows, unlike the West where education is 
productive, the unemployment rates are higher among the most educated people in 
the region, especially among youth. “If we accept that lower unemployment 
rates in the middle and high-income countries are indications of                
higher productivity of their educated workers, the fact that MENA 
[Middle Eastern and North Africa] workers with secondary and                  
tertiary education suffer greater unemployment suggests that                     
education in MENA is less productive than elsewhere” (13). The              
Iranian labor-minister recently reported that “the unemployment rate 
among the university graduates is ten times higher than the ones with 
high-school or lower education.” 27 However, despite the economic 
hardship and higher unemployment rates among the educated youth, 
freedom, democracy, and respect of human dignity were the most 
chanted and expressed demands among the activists and youth who 
participated in the uprisings. This is a notable lesson that most                    
socio-political activists as well as the public have learned from history, 
especially from the collapse of the former Soviet Union. It is not possible 
to achieve economic justice through tyrannical regimes (so called “dictatorship 
of proletariat” in the communist nations); democracy, freedom, and 
respect of human and civil rights are preconditions to gain better               
economic justice and socio-economic equality. 
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Endnotes 
1.http://www.pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Five-Years-
After-911The-Clash-of-Civilizations-Revisited.aspx. See also New 
York Times (October 13, 2001). 
 
2.The core of Edward Said critiques on clashes of civilizations can be 
found in his earlier writings, especially in his popular thesis 
“essentialism” vs. “non-essentialism.” Said challenges the idea that 
Western Culture is rationale, developed, and superior while the                
Middle Eastern and North African Cultures are undeveloped, static, 
and irrational. For more see, Edward Said (1979) Orientalism. 
 
3.“The Clash of Civilizations” is “a perfect paradigm, a thing that 
defines its own field of investigation, that defines its concepts, that 
makes predictions, that even has its own concept of falsification, then 
the perfect example is astrology. The problem is, astrology is non-
sense” (2002:195). For more detailed view of Halliday on September 
11, 2001, see his excellent book: Two Hours That Shook the World. 11 
September 2001, Causes and Consequences.  
 
4.Fred Halliday (1996) classifies the Muslims’ responses to modern 
human right values into five categories—assimilation, appropriation, 
particularism, confrontation, incompatibility.  
 
5.For more on the 2009 election fraud and counter claim, see for      
e x a m p l e : h t t p : / / e n . w i k i p e d i a . o r g / w i k i /
I r a n i a n _ p r e s i d e n t i a l _ e l e c t i o n , _ 2 0 0 9  o r  
http://www.iranaffairs.com/iran_affairs/2009/06/iran-elections-
claims-and-counterclaims-analyzed.html 
23
Kashefi: The “Arab Spring” and its Theoretical Significance: Samuel Huntin
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2013
M. Kashefi/Societies Without Borders 8:2 (2013) 178-204 
~201~ 
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociólogos Sin Fronteras, 2013 
6.For more see, Charles Kurzman (2012) or the following sources: 
http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FMES%
2 F M E S 4 4 _ 0 1 %
2FS0020743811001346a.pdf&code=b7d911d6728c99a628e851f47f40
8 c b f  o r  h t t p : / / w w w . t h e p e o p l e s v o i c e . o r g / T P V 3 /
Voices.php/2011/01/31/iran-s-green-movement-still-inspires 
7 . h t t p : / / w w w . c s m o n i t o r . c o m / C o m m e n t a r y / G l o b a l -
Viewpoint/2011/0615/Iran-s-Green-Movement-has-actually-
achieved-its-goal 
8.For more see:http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?
title=Arab_Spring 
9.See: Esam Al-Amin. 2011. “Understanding Tunisia’s Election 
Results.”In International Policy Digest:October 28-30 (http://
www.internationalpolicydigest.org/author/esam-al-amin/) 
10.http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1353330/Egypt-protests
-Christians-join-hands-protect-Muslims-pray-Cairo-protests.html 
11.http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137053/fouad-ajami/the-
arab-spring-at-one 
12.http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136699/anthony-
billingsley/writing-constitutions-in-the-wake-of-the-arab-spring 
1 3 . h t t p : / / w w w . u n . o r g / a p p s / n e w s / s t o r y . a s p ?
NewsID=43866&Cr=syria&Cr1 
1 4 . h t t p : / / w w w . h u r r i y e t d a i l y n e w s . c o m / d e f a u l t . a s p x ?
pageid=438&n=8216arab-spring-forces-looking-to-turkey-rather-than
-iran-model8217-2011-10-28 
15.Huntington intentionally underestimated the growth of “non-
religious,” atheists, and agnostics. The same table that shows the 
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